Consumer choice at the corner store : Costa Rica's competition authority fines Coca-Cola by Anthony, Debra
In the beginning, there was Coca-Cola – or there might as
well have been, given the product’s huge place in the
Costa Rican psyche and economy. Many Costa Ricans were
therefore understandably surprised when the Coca-Cola
Interamerican Corporation — the Coca-Cola Company’s
Costa Rican subsidiary — and its bottler, Panamco Tica,
were scolded and sanctioned by the national competition
agency in 2004.
“Most people here think that these kinds of companies
cannot be sued, that they have too much power,” says
Agustina Cobas, a reporter with La República newspaper in
San José.
The case before the Comisión para Promover la
Competencia (CPC) started as a battle between giants. Rival
beverage manufacturer PepsiCo, two of its subsidiaries,
and their Costa Rican bottler filed a complaint in 2001
against the Atlanta-based Coca-Cola Company, Coca-Cola
Interamerican Corporation, and Panamco Tica. The Pepsi
companies claimed that the Coca-Cola makers were engag-
ing in anticompetitive agreements between companies at
different points on the production chain — in this case
between manufacturer and retailer. The country’s 1994
competition legislation, the first in Central America,
prohibits these practices.
During the same year, three national soft drink and juice
makers — La Mundial, La Cruz Blanca, and La Flor — also
joined the suit. The competition agency agreed to look at
the following charges: imposing resale prices and minimum




















Consumer Choice at the Corner Store
Costa Rica’s competition authority fines Coca-Cola.
The benefits of competition policy are not always clear to the average consumer.
But people in Costa Rica noticed when a competition authority ruling forced
Coca-Cola makers to change their practices. The highly visible case is helping to
build political will to tighten the legislation.
1
C a s e s t u d y
The Coca-Cola case provides a reminder that competition law
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machines and refrigeration equipment to carry their prod-
ucts exclusively; requiring some stores to carry their prod-
ucts exclusively; tying the sale of one product to the sale
of another; and charging different prices to different
buyers.
A complex case
To rule against Coca-Cola, the CPC had to have proof that
the defendant had substantial market power and had
engaged in activities that were illegal under the competi-
tion law, and that these activities had anticompetitive
effects.
To measure market power, it turned to the parties in the
case for information. “It was atypical because normally it is
the CPC that has to provide the burden of proof of wrong-
doing,” notes Pamela Sittenfeld, who was the executive
director of the CPC during the investigation and who led
an IDRC-funded study on competition in Costa Rica.
All parties turned over reports on their sales, market and
product characteristics, distribution systems, and client and
consumer relationships. The CPC also approached the com-
panies’ clients countrywide for information on such issues
as the defendants’ price, marketing, and sales policies.
Finally, it invited the parties to present their cases before
the CPC.
The case, notes Sittenfeld, marked a milestone for Costa
Rica’s competition legislation. During the two years it took
to resolve it, it became notorious, she said. It involved
multinationals; it was complex; and there were mountains
of paperwork that required a lot of time and resources to
appraise. “The arguments used by the different parties
were very sophisticated,” Sittenfeld says. Injunctions upon
injunctions were filed before the Constitutional Court.
One thorny issue was the CPC’s categorization of the
product market. Using the information obtained from the
participants in the case, the CPC lumped non-alcoholic
carbonated beverages with canned and bottled fruit juices,
arguing that these products were substitutes for each
other. The information had shown that a price increase in
one product meant that the demand for it would fall
against demand for the other product.
“This was highly controversial. The carbonated beverage
market was very concentrated and Panamco Tica had more
than 85 percent of it,” Sittenfeld recalls. When defined by
the CPC to include all non-alcoholic beverages, Panamco
Tica had a lesser, though still significant portion of the
local market, at 74 percent.
High market entry barriers magnified the Coca-Cola
bottler’s market power. The CPC concluded that the
intensive distribution necessary for this kind of impulse-
buy product, the strength of the established brands, and
the substantial advertising investment needed to enter the
market were all barriers to market entry.
A landmark verdict
The CPC fined Panamco Tica for obligatory pricing and
exclusivity agreements. Sales agreements with retailers
included clauses on suggested retail prices: some even
obliged Coca-Cola vendors to stick to the listed price.
According to the CPC, this hindered intra-brand competi-
tion between different establishments selling the same
products and restricted retailers’ freedom to establish their
own prices.
Sales contracts also prevented retailers in some areas from
stocking competing brands. The CPC ruled that these
exclusivity agreements reduced competition and restricted
market entry to new participants. It told the Coca-Cola
bottler that, given its market share, such behaviour was
unjustifiable.
For most Costa Ricans, beverage coolers epitomized the
case. Coca-Cola makers gave retailers refrigerators display-
ing the soft-drink logo, on condition that only the com-
pany’s products could be stored in them. While this
provision may seem understandable, the CPC noted, the
The case established that “companies with large market shares













exclusive refrigerators restricted competitors’ market access
and reduced consumer choice in very small establishments
where there was room for just one beverage cooler. If
there was sufficient space for additional equipment, then
the practice was allowed, the agency said.
Sanctions followed immediately. Although both Coca-Cola
Interamerican Corporation and Panamco Tica were held
responsible, fines were imposed only on the bottler
because “they were the ones who were actually commit-
ting the infractions in the market,” Sittenfeld says.
The CPC ordered the Coca-Cola Interamerican Corporation
to take corrective measures, says Isaura Guillen, Sittenfeld’s
successor as CPC executive director. “Coca-Cola was told
not to issue directives or guidelines to its bottler to per-
form actions that were anticompetitive.”
Panamco Tica was fined about US$80 000 for imposing
resale prices and was ordered to discontinue the practice.
The CPC ruled that a company with substantial market
power should make it clear that its clients were not
obliged to follow the price lists.
Another US$80 000 fine was levied for negotiating product
exclusivity in stores and an order was issued to remove
such clauses from all contracts. The CPC also ordered
Panamco Tica to discontinue the policy of refrigeration
equipment exclusivity in small establishments.
The case set several important behavioural parameters for
companies in Costa Rica. “It established that companies
with large market shares like Coca-Cola and its bottler
must walk softly,” Guillen says.
“And,” Sittenfeld adds, referring to the ruling on exclusiv-
ity agreements, “it established the concept of physical
barriers to competitiveness that was not very clear in
the law.”
More teeth needed
The case also highlighted some of the problems inherent
in the competition law. Indeed, Costa Rica’s Promotion of
Competition and Effective Consumer Protection Law dis-
plays many of the characteristic problems of the region’s
early legislation to encourage competition. IDRC-funded
research on competition policy in Central America, which
included the Costa Rican study, helped to identify these
limitations, as well as the type of legislation and competi-
tion authorities best suited to the political, legal, and
cultural realities of each country and the region as whole.
One of the problems with the Costa Rican law is that it
leaves out many sectors, says Claudia Schatan, head of
the International Trade and Industry Unit at the United
Nations’ Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC) in Mexico, who led the six-country
research effort. “It has a huge number of exceptions,” she
notes. “Public enterprises and certain cooperatives, such as
milk and sugar, cannot be sued.”
For Sittenfeld, however, the most important drawbacks of
the law deal with merger issues and the ability to collect
information to resolve cases. “Companies do not have to
notify the CPC before mergers and there are no adequate
measures to analyze these types of transactions,” she
explains.
“The CPC also needs to broaden its investigation abilities
because now it can only ask for information, public or
confidential, from the parties involved in a case. It cannot
seize documents or carry out raids on offices, for instance,
tools which would prove useful to the Commission in the
future.” In the Coca-Cola case, she explains, the CPC relied
on information provided by the company, but companies
under investigation have no incentive to turn over infor-
mation that could be held against them.
Many of the Costa Rican law’s shortcomings are currently
being addressed in proposed legislation that the CPC is
developing. “We are looking at many of the shortcomings
to make the law more effective and give us more inves-
tigative tools,” Guillen says.
Costa Rica’s 1994 competition legislation, the first in













The challenge for small agencies
With or without the legal changes, cases like this one will
challenge small agencies, such as the CPC in Costa Rica,
which relies on a staff of 15 to hand down about 60 reso-
lutions a year. “Resolving cases involving these companies
absorbs a lot of the agencies’ resources. It is not a matter
of independence, or technical capability, but rather a
matter of the number of people that an agency can throw
at these cases. This is what directly affects the ability to
hand down resolutions,” Sittenfeld says.
One of the criticisms leveled at the CPC during the Coca-
Cola case was the amount of time it took to issue a verdict.
But, Guillen notes, it was a large case with many legal
challenges and a lot of paperwork.
As the CPC works on getting its proposed law through
the legislative assembly, the Coca-Cola case provides a
reminder that competition law can have a direct impact on
consumer choice. The CPC has ruled and published opin-
ions on competition in such areas as sausage-making, roof
sheeting, trucking, and national passenger airlines. But it is
the bottles of Pepsi and a national soft drink brand like La
Mundial in a store’s Coca-Cola refrigerator that shows con-
sumers what competition looks like at the end of the line.
This case study was written by Debra Anthony, a writer in
Mexico City. It is based on the ECLAC research report,
Ventajas y limitaciones de la experiencia de Costa Rica en
materia de políticas de competencia: un punto de
referencia para la región centroamericana, by Pamela
Sittenfeld.
The views expressed in this case study are those of
IDRC-funded researchers and of experts in the field.
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